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INTRODUCTION

The meaning of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act' ("SOX") is still being contested even though it is now nearly five years since its enactment. This is not
to say the words and phrases that make up the statutory mandates and implementing regulations are hopelessly muddled. Though there are plenty of
ambiguities for lawyers and their clients to worry over, most of the require* Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Thanks to Bill Bratton, Steve Choi, Walter Dellinger, Mitu Gulati, John Coates, David Skeel, Robert
Eli Rosen, Mitt Regan, Vicki Jackson, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, workshop participants at Duke and
Georgetown, and participants and commentators at the Sarbanes-Oxley symposium at the University
of Michigan for valuable comments, and to Michael Cohen for his research assistance.
1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and
29 U.S.C. (Supp. II 2003)).
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ments are clear enough as "law on the books" to expect at least formalistic
compliance with them. But simply because something is enacted into law
does not tell us much about how strongly it will influence economic behavior. At the very least, there is the rational calculus of likelihood of detection
and magnitude of sanction. Most of SOX's implementation and enforcement
is left to the discretion of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
and other public agencies.2 We therefore should estimate what the regulators
will do-which will bring into play an interesting mix of external politics
and the agencies' own beliefs.3 Courts, too, will play a role in saying what
SOX means when they review the Commission's rules and enforcement actions, as will Congress in its continuing legislative oversight.
Socio-legal researchers tell us, however, that even the coupling between
official legal interpretations and social behavior is fairly loose-that absent
unusually high rates of detection and prosecution, compliance decisions are
based at least as much on the perceived legitimacy of the law and prevailing
norms in local context as any deliberate risk calculation.4 Business people
form their own beliefs about SOX independently from official interpretations, and they act accordingly. So do other groups like lawyers,
accountants, investors, media, and politicians. These groups' perceptions
influence each other as to appropriate corporate governance and behavior.5
This is more than just a political battle, although the political dimension is
surely potent. SOX has a cultural dimension as well, which political muscle
alone cannot easily override.
The viewpoints in competition range from the idea that the Act ought to
be firmly embraced for stopping a threatened market meltdown by restoring
trust between companies and investors 6 to the notion that it is a quack cure
for an overblown problem and 7 a $1.4 trillion
debacle for investors and the

2. The main other governmental actors are the SOX-created Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board ("PCAOB"); the Department of Justice with respect to criminal enforcement, and
the Department of Labor with respect to whistle-blower protection. SOX largely avoids creating or
expanding any private remedies.
3. A separate article of mine explores this mix inside the SEC. Donald C. Langevoort, The
SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About hivestor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Langevoort, SEC as a Lawmaker]. For more jaundiced perspectives, see Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, I VA. L.
& Bus. REV. 10, 44-48 (2006); A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1073 (2005).
4.

See generally TOM R. TYLER,

LAW (1990); IAN AYRES & JOHN
(1992); Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 307
(2004).
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE

BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION

5. See Gerald F Davis, New Directions in CorporateGovernance, 31
158(2005).

ANN. REV. SOC.

143,

6. See, e.g., Paul Volcker & Arthur Levitt, Jr., In Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J.,
June 14, 2004, at A16; David Wessel, Moving the Market: Corporate Overhauls are Proving to be
Effective, Greenspan Says, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2005, at C3.
7. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
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economy. 8 The more interesting questions are who is debating and why.
Rent seeking is palpable, but far from the whole story. The economics and
ideology of manager-investor relationships 9 and the United States' law-

making competence in the global economy are also in play.
The closer one looks at SOX and its origins in the financial scandals of
the early 2000s, the blurrier the picture, which lets commentators see what
they want to see and draw inferences accordingly. '° That is why social con-

struction is so crucial. My aim in this paper is to illuminate the social nature
of SOX's diffusion into practice. I will leave to the reader the judgment
about whether this has been or will be good or bad, and for whom. If I seem

to challenge SOX's critics more than its supporters, it is because the critics
have been more venomous than is fair. Venom aside, the bite still deserves
attention.
A reasonable concern is that we should not worry about something as
fuzzy as social construction. We can observe how SOX has influenced behavior since its adoption, and that is what is important-not what selfinterested parties say or think about the law. Numerous empirical studies in
law, accounting, and finance have tested SOX's effects. These studies, however, are preliminary-because the rule-making process takes time, many of
the Act's mandates did not go into effect until very recently, and implementation of certain provisions for some affected parties is still being delayed."
They also suffer from their own methodological challenges, because the
events surrounding SOX were very noisy. Quite apart from the legislation
itself, political attitudes and investor expectations also shifted in response
to the financial reporting scandals." Determining whether reactions were
8.
HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT
WE'VE LEARNED, How TO Fix IT 5 (2006). The $1.4 trillion figure comes from Ivy Xiying Zhang's

study trying to measure the stock market effects of SOX-related events, a difficult task that has
actually led to many different estimates. Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of the
Sarbanes-Oxley

Act

of 2002

(2005),

http://w4.stem.nyu.edu/accounting/docs/speaker-papers/

spring2005/Zhang-lvy-Economic-Consequences.oLS_O.pdf; see infra note 13.
9. On unpacking corporate law and economic ideology, see Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson,
The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and CorporateLaw, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (2004).
10. Cf Joseph A. Grundfest, We Must Never Forget That It Is an Inkblot We Are Expounding:
Section 10(b) as Rorschach Test, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 41 (1995) (making a similar point about
another important event in securities regulation, the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of
Denver N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)).
11.
This is particularly so for what has turned out to be the most controversial part of the
legislation, the requirement in SOX section 404 that auditors independently attest to management's
assessment of the company's internal controls. The SEC has delayed the applicability of section
404's requirements to smaller issuers and foreign companies, and is revising its interpretive guidance. See infra note 113. On the interpretive contest over section 404 prior to these most recent
changes, see Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate
Law's "Duty of Careas Responsibilityfor Systems", 31 J. CorP. L. 949, 965-70 (2006) [hereinafter
Langevoort, InternalControls].
12. Related to this is definitional uncertainty. SOX, for the most part, merely amends the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, so that in referring to SOX what I really mean is all of post-SOX
securities regulation. In turn, post-SOX securities regulation has its own definitional ambiguity,
plausibly including not only SEC and PCAOB regulation but also important aspects of federal
criminal law, state securities law (e.g., New York's Martin Act as aggressively enforced by Eliot
HeinOnline -- 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1819 2006-2007
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to the legislation itself or these other effects is hard. 3 Finally, we cannot
assume that first reactions to any law will necessarily be sustained: there can
be an overreaction in the first instance that calms as the interpretation of the
law shifts both officially and unofficially.
To this end, Part I will take a close look at the legitimacy of SOX by examining the two plausible stories of SOX's origins and considering the early
post-SOX evidence on its costs and benefits. There is no clear-cut answer to
the question of how much SOX benefits investors; both positive and critical
positions are plausible. Costs have been far greater than expected, but more
from SOX's implementation than from the legislative text. Before turning to
how and why implementation has occurred that way-which to me is the
central question of interpretation-Part II considers whether there is an alternative interpretation of SOX that explains its motivations and likely longterm effects. This raises the possibility that SOX's most important effects
may be less about investor protection than about renegotiating the boundary
between the public and private spaces in big corporations, a much deeper
ideological issue. The legislation may reflect a political instinct that incentive structures in modem public corporations generate risks that require
public (not just investor) accountability to be legitimate. I suggest the "independent" director, currently seen largely as an investor advocate, is being
pushed toward becoming a "public" director whose main assignment is to
keep risks and rewards in a socially acceptable balance. Part III then turns to
the various interpretive communities debating SOX's meaning, anticipates
how they are likely to respond, and considers the resulting behavioral impact of their criticism or praise. In Part IV I predict, consistent with neither
enthusiasm nor harsh criticism of the legislation, that the interpretive pluralism will gradually moderate both costs and benefits, slowly tilting toward
the "public values" account described in Part II. Part V addresses the most
specific criticism of SOX, involving so-called going-dark transactions and
the impact on foreign issuers. I conclude by connecting SOX to larger questions about how law becomes part of social and economic practice.

Spitzer, see Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations Post-Eliot Spitzer,
70 BROOK. L. REV. 117 (2004)), and the corporate governance reforms by the stock exchanges that
came out of the same political turmoil. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critiqueof the NYSE's Director Independence Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370 (2002). Because all of these affect
perceptions and behavior in ways that are hard to disentangle, my definition of post-SOX securities
regulation is deliberately capacious.
13. See Reena Aggarwal & Rohan Williamson, Did New Regulations Target the Relevant
Corporate Governance Attributes? (Feb. 12, 2006), http://www.ssm.com/abstract=859264. There
have been numerous efforts to test stock price reaction to SOX's adoption as an indication about
how the market viewed the reform effort. E.g., Pankaj K. Jain & Zabihollah Rezaee, The SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 and Capital-MarketBehavior: Early Evidence, 23 CONTEMP. Accr. RES. 629
(2006); Zhang, supra note 8. An interesting effort to elide the noise problem focuses on the stock
price reactions for foreign companies subject to the Act as opposed to those not subject to it. See
Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-US Companies Cross Listed in the US
(Univ. of Texas Law Sch., Law and Econ. Research Paper No. 55, 2005), available at
www.ssm.com/abstract=876624.
HeinOnline -- 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1820 2006-2007
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I. ORIGINS
By most accounts of the recent corporate accounting scandals, Enron by
itself would have produced little more than marginal, mainly symbolic shifts
in federal regulation. But the political dynamic changed in June 2002 when
the WorldCom scandal led to an even bigger corporate implosion. Political
sentiment became angrier, and Democrats were prepared to make these twin
scandals-which by now had produced widespread loss of jobs and billions
in financial losses for investors-a major campaign issue in the fall elections. The House and Senate quickly agreed to cooperate on a hybrid billalthough for procedural reasons the Democrat-controlled Senate handled
most of the work-and SOX was enacted by the end of July. The November
elections produced gains for the Republicans, including taking control of the
Senate. In hindsight, this suggests either that the Republicans acted prudently in taking away the Democrats' edge by their show of bipartisan
cooperation or that they badly overestimated the electoral significance of the
scandals and compromised in an unnecessary panic.
Few would quarrel with the basics of this story. In terms of the legitimacy of the legislation, however, the story has two plausible interpretations.
One interpretation-now heavily emphasized by SOX's critics-argues that
it demonstrates undue haste on difficult issues of financial regulation, resulting in a defective legislative product. But one could just as easily say that
key legislators seized a moment when the public's attention was sufficiently
focused so that normal partisan obstructionism and special-interest domination were briefly displaced. Which of these two interpretations prevails will
tell us something about how SOX is ultimately understood.
This Part considers two related criticisms of the legislative process
meant to undermine SOX's legitimacy. Section L.A examines the claim that
Congress grossly overestimated the benefits SOX's reforms would generate;
Section I.B examines the claim that Congress ignored the costs as well.
A. MisunderstandingBenefits
Roberta Romano, a vocal critic of SOX, provides the most sophisticated
academic exploration into SOX's origins.'4 Romano focuses on a handful of
provisions in the legislation that come closest to the substance of corporate
governance as opposed to securities disclosure. Her most potent claim is
that with respect to director independence and nonaudit services, a large
amount of empirical work had been done by financial economists testing
whether there were grounds to believe that a change in regulation would
produce better outcomes (e.g., superior returns for investors), and that the
weight of the research was that it would not. This leads her to conclude that
14. See Romano, supra note 7, at 1523. Romano's article has generated a number of critical
responses. E.g., John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 91, 105-11(2007); James D. Cox, The Role of Empirical Evidence in Evaluating the Wisdom
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 823, 831-43 (2006); Frank B. Cross & Robert A.
Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 333, 334-37 (2006).
HeinOnline -- 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1821 2006-2007
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SOX was careless legislation, paying no heed to available data about
whether the changes were likely to produce better outcomes in corporate
behavior or to the question of what costs the changes would generate,
thereby precluding any serious cost-benefit assessments.
Romano further argues that, contrary to the suggestion of many, Congress was not simply putting up window dressing to appease an angry
public. That strategy, she says, would have led Congress to make changes
that generate few benefits but also few costs. SOX has real costs, predictable
at the time and amply demonstrated since then. 5 The more plausible reading, then, is that "norm entrepreneurs" committed to the reforms fooled
Congress into thinking that these were really beneficial changes. These
norm entrepreneurs seized the odd political moment to persuade the Senate
Democrats to swallow their medicine. Romano fingers former SEC chair
Arthur Levitt and his former Chief Accountant Lynn Turner as her chief
culprits. She both explains and criticizes their actions as emotional responses to political battles against accountants during their tenures at the
SEC, leading them to dig in their positions despite the acknowledged ab16
sence of empirical support for their ideas.
To be sure, Romano is focusing on only a small handful of provisions to
draw generalizations about SOX ("quackery," she calls it) and the quality of
the law-making process. If she is right in the generalizations, however, she
certainly casts a dark cloud over SOX's legitimacy. If something akin to her
story triumphed among key constituencies in politics, law, and business, the
normative power of the law would be severely undercut. The SEC might not
enforce the law vigorously, either because of external political pressure or
because key actors at the Commission themselves come to doubt the regulation. So, too, in the courts. And compliance in the business community
would be grudging and ritualistic in ways unlikely to cause meaningful
change from the status quo.
With respect to the empirical case, Romano's assessment is well crafted.
It should, however, be put in perspective. Of the four issues she surveys (executive loans, executive "certification" of financial statements, nonaudit
services, and director independence), it is hard to disagree with her analysis
of the outright ban on loans to executives." On the other hand, the SEC
quickly committed to construe the ban narrowly with respect to certain
kinds of loans (executive relocation, advancement for litigation expenses)
that it would be senseless to disrupt. The SEC thereby reduced the untoward
effects of the ban. The main residual effect has been to preclude loans for
financing executives' purchases of company stock, to which we shall return

15.

Romano, supra note 7, at 1587-91.

16.

See id. at 1568-85.

17. Id. at 1561. As Romano points out, this was a last minute amendment by Senator
Schumer of New York. Id. Only one witness in the hearings had suggested a ban; the more plausible
suggestions involved greater disclosure with respect to loans.
HeinOnline -- 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1822 2006-2007
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in Part II8 As to the requirement that senior executives "certify" their SEC
filings, the SEC already had the ability to sanction executives who signed
financials aware of their inaccuracy, so this could easily be seen as a window dressing.' 9 Few benefits, then, but little additional cost. In fact, the

certification requirement was actually a Republican proposal, which the
SEC was planning to implement after Enron even without legislative authority.
The other two issues, nonaudit fee bans and independent director requirements, deserve a closer look. While the weight of empirical research
has failed to find a significant correlation between nonaudit fees and audit
quality generally, 2° there is empirical evidence linking the two when corporate governance indicators are otherwise poor (i.e., managerial control is
high).2' There is also evidence indicating that audit quality did decline in the

late 1990s, 2 a period of rapid growth in the marketing of nonaudit services
by public accounting firms.23

18. Id. at 1539-40. Romano is harshly critical of this because of the benefits associated with
greater equity ownership by officers and directors.
19. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of
Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 45
(2002). When the White House included officer certification on its list of responses to the scandals,
critical analysis into its merits simply ceased. To be fair, there is much concern with the certification
as it applies to internal controls, the most controversial of SOX's requirements, see supra note 11
and infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text; this concern, however, is more about the controls
requirement than certification itself. While the economic value of certification may seem small, its
psychological impact may be great. To the extent that executives think of certification differently
from the way they had approached SEC filings before, there might actually be measurable effects
from what otherwise seems ritualistic.
20. Mark L. DeFond & Jere R. Francis, Audit Research After Sarbanes-Oxley, 24 AUDITING:
J. PRAC. & THEORY 5, 14-16 (Supp. 2005). Prior research here is fairly sketchy because of an absence of data: nonaudit fees in the United States were not subject to mandatory issuer disclosure
until an SEC mandate in 2000. Most of the research, then, relies on post-2000 results,and was work
in progress in 2002. Congress was apparently aware of a well-publicized study by Frankel and his
colleagues that purported to show a relationship between nonaudit fees and levels of abnormal accruals and earnings management. Richard M. Frankel et al., The Relation Between Auditors' Fees for
Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management, 77 ACCT. REV. 71 (Supp. 2002). Since then, that
study has been criticized for its methodology and its results called into doubt.
21. David F. Larcker & Scott A. Richardson, Fees Paid to Audit Firms, Accrual Choices, and
Corporate Governance, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 625 (2004).
22. See Joseph V. Carcello, Discussion of Audit Research After Sarbanes-Oxley, 24 AUDITJ. Plt c. & THEORY 31, 32 (Supp. 2005) (citing, e.g., Marshall A. Geiger & K. Raghunandan,
Going-Concern Opinions in the "New" Legal Environment, 16 ACCT. HORIZONS 17 (2002)). There
was also evidence of increasing numbers of restatements of company financials. See Coates, supra
note 14, at 92-93.
ING:

23. The more plausible inference from this particular evidence is that the decline was mainly
a reaction to a reduction in the liability threat faced by auditors as a result of the Supreme Court's
decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994), and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). If so, the logical response might
have been to restore aiding and abetting liability for auditors or amend the PSLRA to increase the
liability threat. But for a mix of substantive and political reasons Congress would not revisit its
restrictions on private litigation and thus those possibilities were taken off the table. See John W.
Cioffi, Irresistible Forces and Political Obstacles: Securities Litigation Reform and the Structural
HeinOnline -- 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1823 2006-2007
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More importantly, the nonaudit fee ban was a small part of a larger
package of audit reforms in SOX that included, among other things, control
of the auditor-company relationship by the board's audit committee as well
as increased supervision of auditing and accounting through the creation of
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB").24 The failure
to find a significant correlation between nonaudit services and declining
audit quality might only indicate there are other conflicts dominating the
nonaudit fee issue. Audit scholars have pointed to other possibilities, including agency cost issues in terms of local office or individual audit partners'
total income (audit and nonaudit fees) being concentrated in particular clients, 2' and psychological biases in the form of cognitive dissonance. 26 If they
are correct, then the critique is less damning: even if one particular strategy
regarding nonaudit fees might have been misdirected, the effort-and overall structural approach in the legislation-might still be justified. Congress
may have been shooting with a scattergun, in other words, but it was firing
at what appeared to be a real threat and might reasonably have hoped that
some shot would strike the target.
With respect to post-SOX audit quality generally, the results are positive,
but too preliminary to be firm. Measures of earnings management and abnormal accruals appear to be down since 2002.27 Of course we cannot
necessarily give SOX credit for this because, as noted earlier, we might have
expected higher quality accounting and auditing even in the absence of
statutory reform simply because the marketplace demanded it or regulators
credibly threatened to use their preexisting authority more aggressively. But
something seems to have worked. In this light, SOX's accounting and auditing provisions as a whole do not look quite so ill considered.
With respect to independent directors, Congress's intervention was
small-insistence on an audit committee of independent directors (a move
the stock exchanges had already largely made) and on disclosure of whether
at least one member of the audit committee had financial expertise. If we
expand our definition of SOX to include all those exchange reforms, 28 the
Regulation of Corporate Governance 41 (Comparative Research In L. & Political Econ. Research
Paper Series, Paper No. 7/2006), available at http://www.ssm.conabstract=902648.
24. James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the Metricsfor Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 321-23 (2003).
25. DeFond & Francis, supra note 20, at 15. See also Anwer Ahmed & Scott Duellman,
Auditor Independence, Corporate Governance and Abnormal Accruals 23 (Oct. 2005), http://
www.ssrn.com/abstract=887301. For survey evidence, see Mark W. Nelson et al., Evidence from
Auditors about Managers'and Auditors'Earnings Management Decisions, 77 ACCT. REV. 175, 192
(Supp.2002).
26. E.g., Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, 38
REV. 89, 90 (1997); Nelson et al., supra note 25, at 189-98.

SLOAN

MGMT.

27. Carcello, supra note 22, at 33; Daniel Cohen et al., Trends in Earnings Management and
Informativeness of Earnings Announcements in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods (Feb. 1,
2005), http://www.ssm.com/abstract=658782; see also Marshall A. Geiger et al., Recent Changes in
the Association between Bankruptcies and Prior Audit Opinions, 24 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY
21 (2005); Coates, supra note 14, 106-07.
28.

See supra note 12.
HeinOnline -- 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1824 2006-2007
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insistence on director independence is more extensive. It requires, for instance, an independent majority on the board, the independence of key
committees, and procedures for forming independent directors as a distinct
working group.
Legal, business, and finance scholars have spent a great deal of effort
over the last two decades assessing whether changes in corporate governance correlate with good or bad outcomes; director independence is
probably the most studied of these aspects.29 Researchers have yet to find

strong evidence that a greater percentage of independent directors produces

better operating income or stock price returns.3 0 The common explanation
for this failure is that entrenched insiders can populate the board with formally independent, but functionally loyal, outsiders, or with outsiders
insufficiently informed or motivated to upset the status quo. In addition, it is

fairly well accepted that governance mechanisms can be substitutes for each
other, so that examining one possibility (such as director independence) will
not pick up alternative mechanisms (such as high-powered incentive contracts for executives) even in good governance settings.
A separate research program seeks correlations between governance
measures such as independence and the likelihood of fraud or other financial
irregularities at the firm. Because formal determinations of fraud are rare,

researchers choose rough proxies for fraud, such as the bringing or settlement of an SEC enforcement action or private class action, an earnings
restatement, or abnormal accruals. Although the empirical evidence is conflicting, many researchers have concluded that good governance practices
and fraud are negatively related." Some of these results relate specifically to
the audit committee--Congress's main interest as well. Work by April
Klein, for example, finds evidence of less earnings management as the percentage of independent directors on the committee goes up, though not

necessarily to 100% (although she finds evidence of greater earnings
29. For a good summary of the research, see Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAw. 921, 921-23
(1999).
30. See, e.g., id. Recently, there has been support for the idea that entrenchedboards correlate with poorer performance. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The costs of entrenched
boards, 78 J. FIN. EcON. 409, 410 (2005); Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003). This remains an ongoing project, with some researchers convinced that more refined empirical work can find more substantial correlations between good
governance structures and returns to shareholders. For a discussion, see Aggarwal & Williamson,
supra note 13. The proliferation of institutional investor services that rate corporate governance
characteristics for individual firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., is based on the
assumption that this relationship either has or will be demonstrated. See infra note 78.
31. E.g., Mark S. Beasley, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and FinancialStatement Fraud, 71 ACT. REV. 443, 445 (1996); April Klein,
Likely Effects of Stock Exchange Governance Proposalsand Sarbanes-Oxley on CorporateBoards
and FinancialReporting, 17 AccT. HORIZONS 343, 354 (2003); Hatice Uzun et al., Board Composition
and Corporate Fraud, 60 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 33, 41 (2004). As with all statistical studies, causation
cannot automatically be inferred even from clear-cut correlation. Good governance practices may be
chosen by high-performing firms as a symbol of quality even if they do not produce the quality, and
correlations in settings where adherence to a governance standard is voluntary may not be replicated
where adherence is mandatory.
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management when a company changes the composition of the committee
away from 100%).32 On earnings restatements, Agrawal and Chadha find no
significant relationship with respect to audit committee independence generally, but do find one when there is financial expertise among independent
audit committee members. 3' Although this evidence fails to prove that requiring 100% independence plus financial expertise on the audit committee
has value, there is at least a circumstantial case for favoring independent
audit committees.
Here again, note the systemic nature of Congress's response. It is plausible to think, for example, that observed deficiencies with respect to
independent directors result not so much from blind loyalty to the CEO but
from an inability to determine when the CEO is not telling the truth about
the company or is otherwise unfit to serve. 34 Many SOX provisions tweak
the system to help directors compensate for this: financial expertise on the
audit committee is encouraged; auditors are subject to closer regulatory
scrutiny and directed to speak directly to the audit committee rather than
through management; internal controls are improved; lawyers have to report
misconduct directly to the board. It is possible these systemic changes give
more information to the board so that independent directors will address
emerging problems earlier. Even assuming that wholly independent audit
committees in and of themselves produced no measurable benefits in the
past, it would not necessarily mean that independence might not interact
with other changes in a way that produces benefits.
B. The Cost Problem and the Debate over InternalControls
The foregoing shows that Congress had more of a basis for expecting
benefits from these SOX changes than critics suggest. That is not an insignificant point with respect to its perceived legitimacy, especially since
measures such as audit quality seem to have improved since 2002. But expected benefits are not enough to justify legislation, and I have not yet said
anything about the expected costs of the SOX reforms. The costs of a ban on
nonaudit services are obvious to the accounting firm (lost income) and may
spill over into the firm's ability to attract and retain professional talent.

32.

April Klein, Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings manage-

ment, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 375, 376 (2002); see also Biao Xie et al., Earnings management and
corporate governance: the role of the board and audit committee, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 295, 314 (2003).
But see Jean Bedard et al., The Effect of Audit Committee Expertise, Independence, and Activity on
Aggressive EarningsManagement, 23 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 13, 14 (2004) (finding significant effects when 100% of the audit committee members are independent).
33. Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, 48
J.L. & EcON. 371, 374 (2005). Carcello points out that this study was done with 2000-01 data, by
which time independent audit committees had become the norm because of New York Stock Exchange reforms and "best practices" understanding, so that testing the effects of independence was
difficult. Carcello supra note 22, at 35.
34. See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the CorporateThermostat: Lessons frm the Recent
FinancialScandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Contrls,93
GEO. L.J. 285, 308-12 (2004) [hereinafter Langevoort, CorporateThermostat].
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There is also a loss of possible synergies from bundling audit and related
services, which might lower the costs to issuers of obtaining useful consulting, technology, and related services. With respect to independent directors
on the audit committee or boards generally, there are the costs of attracting
additional directors and compensating existing directors for the additional
workload, compensation or increased insurance premiums for additional
legal risk, and possibly more subtle costs in terms of trust and interpersonal
relationships.35
The problem, however, is that there is no good scientific mechanism for
quantifying benefits or costs, much less netting them out. Congress made no
serious effort to look deeply at costs, so the risk that it made a poor judgment as to trade-offs is serious.3 6 But the poor judgment is not self-evident,
either. This is where only post-SOX evidence can be of help, and it is too
early to pass judgment. It appears that director fees and insurance premiums
have gone up,37 but audit quality apparently has also.
The larger point here is that SOX compliance costs are more a matter of
how the legislation is interpreted and enforced than what Congress said in
the statutory text. The best example is section 404, SOX's most controversial provision, which mandates an audit of the issuer's internal controls
system and management's evaluation thereof. By all accounts, this has been
extremely costly in terms of additional fees paid to audit firms, not to mention internal resources spent on controls systems. Post-SOX empirical
research has identified significant benefits as well: marketplace actors seem
3s
to find the new information about internal control deficiencies useful. Netting out is hard here, but there is widespread skepticism-which I sharethat the balance was well struck initially, especially for smaller firms. The
resulting burden is said to be a major reason why the rate of companies
ceasing to be public companies post-2002 has risen, 39 and why foreign companies are more reluctant than before to voluntarily assent to U.S. regulatory
authority.40

35. See James S. Linck et al., Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act on Corporate Boards (May 16, 2006) (Am. Fin. Ass'n 2006 Boston Meeting Paper), available at
http://www.ssm.com/abstract=902665. In prior work, I have cautioned about the more subtle costs.
Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Laws, Norms, and the Unintended
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001) [hereinafter
Langevoort, Human Nature].
36. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policyakers, Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 255 (2005).
37.

Linck et al., supra note 35, at 5.

38. See, e.g., Hollis Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on
Firm Risk and Cost of Equity Capital (April 13, 2006), http://www.ssm.com/abstract=896760.
39. See William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of
"Going Private", 55 EMORY L.J. 141 (2006). But see Coates, supranote 14, at 108.
40.

See infra Part V.
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I have explored the cost-benefit problem under section 404 in some
depth elsewhere4' and do not want to repeat a complicated story. The statutory text was extraordinarily ambiguous, leaving a great deal of discretion to
the SEC and PCAOB as to what it demands. After all, public companies
have been required to have "reasonable" systems of internal control in place
42
since the late 1970s, and auditors have long taken some account of the control environment in doing their audit. section 404 could have been seen as a
minor and not terribly expensive tweaking of this, or as something much
more. Plainly, we have gotten much more. But this is because accountants,
lawyers, and consultants captured the meaning of the statutory text early on
in ways that-whatever the merits of the interpretation otherwise-have
generated large rents for their professional activities, aided by extraordinarily open-ended PCAOB pronouncements that the SEC approved. The
regulators are now backing off that breadth with remarkable alacrity.43 This
is an interpretive story that I seek to generalize in Parts III and IV.
II. Is SOX JUST ABOUT INVESTOR PROTECTION?

By its terms, SOX is about investor protection and should be evaluated
as such. But it is entirely possible that deeper instincts about the modem
corporation as a politically accountable institution played a role in its adoption. An important theme in stories about Enron and WorldCom was social
and economic dislocation, not simply investor losses. The two companies
were characterized by rapid growth during which insiders gained control
over extensive and important assets. Leveraging their companies' own stock
prices as well as the short-term debt and derivatives markets, the insiders
took considerable risks to fuel this growth. 44 Subsequent discovery of fraud
and misreporting then led quickly to loss of access to capital and then insolvency, which in turn hurt employees, investors, and the communities to
which they were connected. Moreover, the fraud itself resulted in misallocation of capital and competitive harm to the relevant markets. By one
estimate, WorldCom's misreporting caused more than $7 billion in harm to
other telecommunication providers
and frustrated key elements of national
45
telecommunications policy.
As many commentators have pointed out, some deception along these
lines was not necessarily a bad gamble on behalf of the company's well41.
See Langevoort, Internal Controls, supra note 11, at 957-65. See also Joseph A.
Grundfest & Steven E. Bochner, Fixing 404, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1643 (2007).
42.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(2000).

43.

See infra note 113 and accompanying text.

44.

See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2003); DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL
FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 5-6 (2005). Notably, while insider
greed may be part of the story, it may have been secondary to competitiveness. See Baruch Lev,
CorporateEarnings:Factsand Fiction, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 36 (2003).

45. J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse ofAmerican Telecommunications After Deregulation,20 YALE J. ON REo. 207, 235 (2003).
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diversified investors, 46 especially those who bought into the company earlier
rather than later. Had the game continued with a streak of good luck, as it
might have for either company, stockholders as well as insiders would have
been winners as their firms cemented dominant positions in rapidly expanding, lucrative markets. The downside risk, however, was allocated very
unequally. Diversified investors (including insiders who had cashed out or
hedged their company stock and options holdings) faced far less risk than
employees, undiversified investors, and creditors-and employees with retirement assets heavily tied up in company stock were particularly exposed.
SOX responded to the resulting carnage. Notably it refused shareholders
any more governance power, either in terms of voting rights (e.g., greater
shareholder access to the corporate ballot, so that directors would be more
subject to shareholder control)47 or private litigation. This absence is strange
if one thinks the scandals were manifestations of classic agency cost problems, but perfectly consistent with the idea that the scandals were the result
of over-heated incentives that investors are unlikely to check.
A palpable theme in much of SOX is discomfort with those over-heated
incentives and insistence on more public accountability, so that large business corporations meet standards resembling those commonly expected of
public and quasi-public institutions. The exercise of dominion over crucial
assets, the opportunities for wealth extraction, and the ability to impose risk
on others give sufficient cause to insist on internal standards and procedures
that are typical of contemporary "good government" initiatives familiar in
4
administrative law and other public law subjec ts-transparency,
accountability, and openness to external voices. In this sense, SOX is less about
redistributing private power as diffusing it through more checks, balances,
and sunlight. Implicit is a connection to the precautionary principlecounter-balancing the high-powered incentives that can incline managers to
be strong risk-seekers. Enron and WorldCom showed that hidden risks of
this sort can be very dangerous, and a natural response is to say that they
should be constrained by more robust deliberative procedures. 9 Shareholders may benefit from this too, but that benefit is not the sole measure of its
efficacy.
46. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of ShareholderValue, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275, 1326-27 (2002). As I and others have repeatedly suggested, there was no doubt an element of hubris in the placing of these bets, but hubris may be something of a survival trait in
intensely competitive environments. See Langevoort, CorporateThermostat, supra note 34.
47. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833 (2005) (calling for such reforms).
48.
(2000).

E.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543

49. E.g., CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LAws OF FEAR (2005). On application within the SEC, see Troy
A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's Regulatory Philosophy,Style and
Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 1007-1010. There is a close relationship here between this notion and "corporate social responsibility" where firms risk being penalized in various markets if
they act in a way inconsistent with their social license. See Gunningham et al., supra note 4, at 32021; Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the AngloAmerican ShareholderValue Construct,38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 533-36 (2005).
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To me, this public accountability reading would explain a number of
features of the legislation. The new quasi-public regulation of the accounting profession (substituting for the prior system of self-regulation in audit
standard setting) is explicitly designed to address the public interest. 50 The
statutory language creating the PCAOB says that its authority and structure
extend beyond investor protection;5 in one of its earliest important pronouncements the new Board drew from this language to state that the
intended beneficiaries of its work are "the board of directors, management,
employees, investors, lenders, customers, and regulators, '5 2 thereby signaling that it did not intend to make shareholder value the sole measure for
accounting's contributions. The insistence on auditor independence from
nonaudit income sources discussed earlier is in part a declaration that auditors are unlikely to internalize their public audit responsibilities if audit
work is just a loss leader for the marketing of other product lines.
The ban on executive loans" fits this account, as the most notorious use
of company loans was to leverage senior executives' purchase of more company stock. As Romano notes, such leveraging is a good thing insofar as
stock ownership more closely aligns executive and shareholder interests.
But like all leveraging, it also adds risk-there is also more incentive to
avoid candor that could lead to a stock price decline and to try to gamble
one's way out to avoid defaulting on a loan. Perhaps Congress was reacting
to too tempting an incentive structure.
SOX's most controversial innovation, requiring an ongoing implementation, evaluation, and audit of the company's system of internal controls, fits
this account as well.55 This requirement opens up the internal architecture of
the firm,56 creating better sight lines so that more people (including public
auditors) can more easily observe and verify the movement and positioning
of assets and information. Insofar as corporate reporting obligations are now
far more attentive to risk taking, the internal architecture must encompass
50. On the tension between public interest and shareholder demand models of accounting
regulation, calling for greater emphasis on the former, see William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value
and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439, 485 (2003).
51.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 721 l(a) (Supp. mI 2003) (establishing
the PCAOB "in order to protect the interests of investors and further the public interest").
52.

PCAOB,

AUDITING STANDARD

No. 2:

AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINAN-

App.
E-5 (2005). As discussed below, the PCAOB has proposed rescinding Auditing Standard No. 2 and
replacing it with an entirely new, less-demanding standard. See PCAOB Rulemaking Docket Matter
021, Rel. 2006-007 (Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://www.pcaob.org/Rules/Docket_021/
index.aspx.
CIAL REPORTING PERFORMING IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

53.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13K, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. II 2003).

54. See Michael C. Jensen, The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the CurrentState of
CorporateFinance, 10 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 549, 552-53 (2004).
55. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. II 2003); see also supra
notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
56. Langevoort, Internal Controls, supra note 11, at 969; Larry CatA Backer, Surveillance
and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004
MIcH. ST. L. REV. 327.
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this as well-bringing internal controls over financial reporting even closer
to other forms of enterprise risk management, such as legal compliance and
operational controls. This is about openness and transparency, and it is not
just tied to what current shareholders or future investors would demand.
This interpretation can also be seen in directors' obligations. Boards
generally, and the audit committee in particular, are given a long list of new
tasks to perform-for example, overseeing and evaluating the relationship
with the independent auditor, monitoring whistle-blower incentive and protection programs, and discussing internal controls with management. These
tasks are likely to crowd out the more traditional role of giving an external
perspective to the CEO about business strategy57 and perhaps take away time
otherwise spent working to assure that managerial behavior aligns with
shareholder wealth maximization.
The emphasis on independent directors makes more sense in this light,
too, a subject to be explored later on. The not-so-subtle message from SOX
is that independent directors bear special responsibility for promoting more
transparency inside and outside the company, starting at the top." The companies' auditors and attorneys are then enlisted to aid the directors in this
task through mandatory "reporting up" obligations with respect to observed
illegalities and other problematic behaviors.5 9 Again, the fact that Congress
chose not to give shareholders greater power in the election process is consistent with an emerging conception of the "public" director. Recall the
earlier discussion of the research that suggests independent directors do not
necessarily create additional firm value, but may tolerate less fraud and illegality. If so, they are already acting to some extent as "public" directors;
SOX simply strengthens this role. Along the same lines, more independent
directors appear to create value for debtholders, a more risk-averse class of
investors. 60 These results seem hard to explain at first, but fit with an account
in which independent directors are meant to be speed bumps for otherwise
risky behaviors.
The foregoing may sound simply like a restatement of a common theme
in the corporate governance literature, in which corporate social responsibil-

57. See James D. Westphal, Collaboration in the Boardroom: Behavioral and Performance
Consequences of CEO-Board Social Ties, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 7, 10-11 (1999); Langevoort, Human
Nature, supra note 35, at 802-03.
58. Langevoort, Internal Controls, supra note 1I, at 954-57. For a discussion of new expectations regarding securities law compliance, see Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directorsas Securities
Monitors, 61 Bus. LAW. 1375 (2006).
59. As to lawyers in particular, this connection is well made in Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M.
Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DuKE L.J. 517 (2003), and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B.
Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The Emergence of the Independent Directors'Counsel, 59
Bus. LAw. 1389 (2004). But see Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance: The Diffusion of QLCCS, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1277-92 (2005) (describing how inhouse lawyers resist bringing directors into the compliance decision-making process).
60. Robert Anderson et al., Board characteristics,accounting report integrity and the cost of
debt, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315,317 (2004).
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ity and the public/private distinction have long been debated." But even if
no more than a familiar theme, it is still worth noting because most commentators have assumed that contemporary American corporate and
securities law has rejected that model, not embraced it. Though there are

echoes here, my reading of SOX is more modest than the unabashedly progressive goals that typically animate calls for more social responsibility.
Legislation of that character would either redistribute power to identifiable
non-shareholder groups or make managers more accountable to them, but
SOX does neither. Its public values relate to process more than substance.

Similarly, this reading differs from the common theme that accountants
and directors are enlisted as "gatekeepers," charged by law with monitoring
61

responsibilities to assure legal compliance. While there is again an overlap,
my reading modifies the idea of gatekeeping. First, it is not tied strictly to a
legal compliance standard, but rather deals more comprehensively with operational risk. Second, gatekeeper theorists have not explicitly recognized
the conflict in roles stemming from such an orientation; to the contrary, the
implicit assumption is often that gatekeeping is at least consistent with a
shareholder protection strategy.63
Early post-SOX evidence is consistent with a caution-inducing account.
In a particularly interesting study, Cohen, Dey, and Lys suggest that SOX

has altered both the compensation structure and risk-taking incentives for
corporate executives, leading to less-risky investment decisions regarding
research and development and capital expenditures. 4 That makes sense intuitively, particularly if either the volatility or financial reporting issues

raised by more aggressive projects increase the legal risk to both company
and form-certifying executives. Accounting also appears to have become
61. The public/private distinction has been emphasized by a number of legal scholars in
assessing the financial scandals. E.g., David A. Westbrook, CorporationLaw After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEo. L.J. 61, 108-10 (2003); Douglas M. Branson,
CorporateSocial Responsibility Redux, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1212-14 (2002). 1 am not claiming
that SOX is the first time the law has tried to push this boundary. In the 1970s, for example, there
was a strong effort to bring more integrity and accountability to public firms, but the effort was
sidetracked by a number of developments in the early 1980s-the free-market politics and ideology
of the Reagan administration, and the booming takeover market as the preferred method of corporate discipline. Though a thorough exploration is beyond the scope of this paper, one can see much
in SOX that is a revival of those earlier efforts. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of
William 0. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005).
62. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004).
63. The conceptual tension between current and future shareholders in defining securities
law "compliance" is underappreciated by corporate law scholars. See Steven Schwarcz, Temporal
Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Currentand Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044
(2005); Langevoort, Internal Controls, supra note 11, at 960-62.
64. Daniel A. Cohen et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Implications for Compensation
Structure and Risk-Taking Incentives of CEOs (July 8, 2005), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=
568483. One effect is the shift from aggressive accounting to actual business choices that have the
desired effect on reported earnings without raising the same risk of legal sanction. John R. Graham
et al., The economic implications of corporatefinancial reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 47-50
(2005) (documenting willingness of executives to forego potentially valuable investment decisions
to achieve desired reporting results).
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more conservative, 61 which is of mixed value to equity investors but consistent with broader conceetions emphasizing the disciplinary nature of both
accounting and auditing. Some sixteen percent of financial companies now
have a "chief risk officer," a position unknown just a few years ago.61
I am not saying that a public-accountability reading of SOX is closer to
its actual intent (whatever that means) than an investor-protection reading. If
I am right about social construction, however, what was intended is less important than what something comes to mean. SOX plants some seeds that, if
climatic conditions turn out right, could grow to change the landscape at the
boundary between what is considered public and private in corporate governance. Readers will no doubt disagree about whether what sprouts will be
flowers or weeds. We have already addressed some of the social costs of
SOX-type initiatives and will turn shortly to others. Dampening risk-taking
and innovation hardly counts as an obvious virtue in the modem economy.
As critics of stakeholder-oriented theories have long pointed out, the more
open-ended the articulation of what corporate governance is supposed to
accomplish in serving public goals, the less discipline it exerts on managers
who try to justify self-serving behaviors in utilitarian terms.6 s At the very
least, however, thinking more broadly about what SOX might be trying to
accomplish puts the legislation in a considerably different light and moves
any discussion of its legitimacy (or measuring its efficacy) in a very different direction.
III.

THE CONTEST OVER SOX's MEANING AND LEGITIMACY

Part I aimed to show that SOX's origins and early history leave open the
possibility of multiple interpretations of its meaning and legitimacy. SOX
may have been a hasty and ill-considered overreaction, a needed reform accomplished at the brief moment when it was possible, or something in
between. Part II described a way of thinking about SOX that differs from the
standard investor protection-oriented account.
But stories about statutory origins and early histories tend to fade in importance-or be revised in collective memory-as regulation is
implemented, interpreted, and enforced. The ongoing political and social
65. Gerald J. Lobo & Jian Zhou, Did Conservatism in FinancialReporting Increase after the
Sarbanes-OxleyAct? Initial Evidence, 20 ACCT. HORIZONS 57, 71 (2006).
66. See Bratton, supra note 50, at 445-46; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Finance Theory and
Accounting Fraud: FantasticFutures versus Conservative Histories, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 789, 793-94
(2005) (describing the tension between accounting's interest in conservative presentation and finance's interest in forward-looking value). For further discussion of this issue see infra text
accompanying notes 89-92.
67. The Conference Board, Corporate Directors May Not Be Providing Sufficiently
Robust Enterprise Risk Oversight, June 6, 2006, http://www.conference-board.org/utilities/
pressDetail.cfm?press_ID--2893 (last visited January 16, 2007).
68. For this reason, single-minded focus on shareholder wealth maximization is seen by
many as the now-dominant paradigm for corporate governance around the world. See generally
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 Gao. L.J. 439
(2001).
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construction of SOX will ultimately determine its impact on doing business.
While it is much too early to say for sure how SOX will fare in this regard,
it is possible to think about which interests will compete to influence both
regulatory choices and perceptions of SOX's legitimacy. Hence, this Part
will describe a stylized negotiation about SOX and its meaning (metaphorically, not in terms of a formal game-theoretic model) among key
participants-corporate executives, institutional investors, the securities industry, accountants, auditors, lawyers, regulators, the media, and corporate
employees. This will necessarily require generalization about these participants, whose beliefs and attitudes are far more dispersed than I suggest, but
this generalization should improve clarity and traction. The goal is simply to
imagine the interaction in the many ways it might play out, and we begin by
considering what each brings to the table.
A. CorporateExecutives
Let me start with a hypothesis: corporate executives generally do not
think of themselves as working directly for corporate shareholders, but for
"the corporation" as an abstract and inchoate (i.e., socially constructed) institution. That is, they see all company stakeholders as essential suppliers of
inputs or purchasers of outputs whose expectations and demands have to be
managed successfully for the firm to succeed. But senior management does
not feel normatively beholden to them." Even the board of directors is more
a mechanism for gaining external resources than a locus of normative authority,' ° although managers certainly respect its formal power. Managers
believe they deserve autonomy and control over the institution as long as
they respect basic legal and business norms and keep their constituents satisfied.
This, of course, is not the received legal model of the firm, which to
most commentators privileges the shareholders as the group closest to being
its owners, and by all accounts makes the managers fiduciaries to the company's shareholders. I admit it is an open question whether managers
actually think of themselves as normatively (rather than legally) bound to
shareholders; some scholars think so, with some disagreement among those
who do regarding whether the normative bond exists because the law demands it or because American capitalism has thoroughly internalized the
notion of shareholder primacy.' My anecdotal observations, however, con69. 1 will leave to the side the question of whether, as orthodox economists predict, their
behavior is largely self-serving and opportunistic, or whether their identity is shaped by the company's culture. See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and the Economics of
Organizations, 19 J. EcON. PERSP. 9, 19-22 (2005); Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black Box
of "CorporateCulture" in Law and Economics, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL EcoN. 80,
84 (2006).
70. See Amy Hillman & Thomas Dalziel, Boards of Directors and Firm Performance:IntegratingAgency and Resource Dependence Perspectives,28 ACAD. MOMT. REV. 383, 385 (2003); see
also Davis, supra note 5, at 153.
71. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1662 (2001).
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vince me that management considers itself a distinctive "in-group" and considers investors, like other stakeholders, an "out-group, 72 albeit one that can
exercise a powerful set of rights if and when it can overcome its collective
action problems. The respect ostensibly paid to shareholders invokes the
rhetoric of fiduciary obligation but is otherwise just the savvy handling of a
potentially powerful constituency.
If this is right, then we should assume that, on average, managers consider SOX an intrusion and resent nearly all of it. They may embrace it
publicly because their investors and regulators expect them to, but see it as
functional only insofar as it lowers the cost of capital to their firms. To managers who believe the capital markets are largely efficient, this means
complying to the extent that investors value the changes positively-but
only to that extent (and they would have felt forced to respond to shifting
capital marketplace demands even without SOX, and thus still resent its
straightjacket). To those with less faith in market rationality, the work will
be more in the form of impression management.73 In either case, a fairly dim
story about SOX's origins would suit these beliefs, although managers of
companies who see their firms as superior might be less critical to the extent
that SOX might help expose the inferiority of "lemon-like" competitors and
help bond their own credibility among investors. No doubt the degree of
criticism will also vary depending on how costly compliance is, which
therefore will make managers of smaller companies more harshly critical
than those of larger ones.
B. InstitutionalInvestors
The standard account of developments in corporate governance and
transparency, pre-SOX at least, was largely about the influence of institutional investors. The growth in their size and sophistication combined with
the emergence of mechanisms and the disappearance of obstacles for coordinating their behavior have made institutional investors increasingly
formidable players in corporate governance. 4 To be sure, successful exercise
of investor power has been uneven and episodic-many institutional investors remain conflicted and unwilling to oppose management, so that activists
rarely expect an easy majority of votes. But most regard the trend as moving
toward more shareholder power rather than less, especially insofar as managers fear large-scale institutional shareholder selling as much or more than
votes in opposition. The available evidence, in turn, suggests that greater
institutional holdings correlate with "better" governance practices and
72. See James D. Cox & Harvey L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 83, 99-108
(1985). As discussed infra, text accompanying notes 117 and 118, it is useful to see managers as
trying to make the board see itself as part of this in-group.
73. See James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Decoupling Policy from Practice: The Case
of Stock Repurchase Programs, 46 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 202, 204 (2001).
74.

See generally MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY MANAGERS ARE

CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA (1996).

HeinOnline -- 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1835 2006-2007

1836

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 105:1817

higher quality disclosure," although it may also increase the temptation for
corporate executives to commit fraud when they fear more certain punishment for poor performance.

76

As noted in Part II, SOX does not affect this balance directly; Congress
was careful, perhaps curiously so, not to enhance shareholders' political
power inside the corporation. The SEC sought to create easier shareholder
access to the ballot a year after SOX, but even this mild effort was re-

buffed,77 with Congress certainly offering no support for change. Nor did
SOX do much to enhance private rights of action under the securities laws,

which institutions increasingly control as lead plaintiffs.
Thus we have to treat institutional investor influence as largely exogenous; its evolution will not, directly at least, be affected by SOX or its
interpretation. Presumably, most institutional investors will embrace those
SOX reforms that they believe will generate positive marketplace value,
though how rationally they will evaluate these reforms is the subject of

some debate. 8 Their main interest is in aligning managerial behavior closer
to shareholder wealth maximization, and they presumably would be uncom-

fortable with SOX reforms that distract board members too much from their
monitoring task or otherwise impose heavy compliance costs. The ambiguity about how well SOX does this probably leaves them somewhat

ambivalent about many of the reforms.
One segment of the institutional investor community has a different set
of preferences, however. Public pension funds and labor-managed private
funds have become very vocal activists, which some commentators view as

attentive to constituencies whose interests diverge from share price maximization. 79 Here we find investor groups that could well construe SOX in the

"public" rather than purely "investor" terms discussed in Part II. Such investors are willing to encourage size as much as efficiency, or prudence rather
75.

See Brian J. Bushee & Christopher E Noe, CorporateDisclosurePractices,Institutional

Investors, and Stock Return Volatility, 38 J. AccT. RES. 171, 172 (Supp. 2000).
76. See David Denis et al., Is there a dark side to incentive compensation?, 12 J. CORP. FIN.
467, 483 (2006); Langevoort, Corporate Thermostat, supra note 34, at 307-08. While widely assumed, the specific link between options-based compensation and the propensity to commit fraud is
far from clear. Compare Daniel Bergstresser & Thomas Philippon, CEO incentives and earnings
management, 80 J. FIN. EcON. 511, 513 (2006) (finding evidence of correlation) with Merle
Erickson et al., Is There a Link Between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?,44 J.
ACCT. RES. 113, 116 (2006) (finding a lack of persuasive evidence); see also Joseph P.O'Connor, Jr.
et al., Do CEO Stock Options Prevent or Promote Fraudulent Financial Reporting?, 49 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 483, 483 (2006) (suggesting that the incentive effects of stock options vary depending on
other conditions).
77. Pamela Atkins, SEC Access Proposal Seen as Dead; Some Shift Focus to Requiring
Majority Vote, 37 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 230, 230 (Feb. 7, 2005).
78. An interesting subject is the diffusion of "good governance" beliefs within the institutional investor community and whether these are well-grounded beliefs, a marketing innovation by
the new "corporate governance industry," or simply the product of mimetic diffusion. For a criticism
of the functionality of these beliefs, see Paul Rose, The CorporateGovernance Industry, 32 J. CoRp.
L. (forthcoming 2007), availableat http://www.ssm.com/abstract=902900.
79. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered,93 COLUM. L. REv. 795 (1993).
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than the aggressive risk-taking that employees, retirement savers, and the

general public might find threatening. To these, greater normative emphasis
on controls, ethics, and law-abidingness might be appealing even if their
effect on profitability or share price value is unclear.
C. The Securities Industry

The securities industry (investment banks, brokerage firms, the stock
markets, etc.) has substantial political power in Washington and is the one
group often said to come closest to effecting "capture" of the SEC. 0 Its political interests fall somewhere in between those of managers and
institutional investors; it is anxious to generate depth, trading volume, and
deal flow, and hence supports the core attributes of securities regulation in

fighting its seamy underside. Wall Street is strongly committed to the "investor confidence" story because it benefits from widespread public
participation in the securities markets. At the same time, domestic industry

players face strong competition from abroad and hence reasonably fear
regulatory arbitrage--economic activity moving to a less-preferred venue
simply to avoid regulatory costs.8' Given the rapid globalization of finance,

U.S. listings of foreign issuers will be affected by SOX's interpretation, as
could decisions by domestic companies about whether to go public in the
first place. Hence, the securities industry is very concerned about both the
perception and reality that SOX is unduly costly because of the impact on its

transactional business. It has to walk a fine line to push Congress or the SEC
to make accommodations without being so vocally critical of SOX that it
feeds perceptions that U.S.-style regulation is dysfunctional. It is thus likely
to take the public position that SOX is good but needs adjustment at the
812
margins.
Perception is an important point here. If the stock market prices investor
protection mechanisms with precise efficiency, Wall Street's interest would
largely coincide with wealth-maximizing institutional investors. But if public investors from time to time become insufficiently sensitive to governance
or transparency problems as opposed to more alluring "stories" and invest
80. E.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of CorporateGovernance: The Coming Preemption of the Martin Act, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 951 (2005).
81. This concern is diminished to the extent that securities industry institutions become
global, as nearly all investment banks are. Still, geographic concentration of power in New York
City leads to natural concern about the U.S. being perceived as unaccommodating to capital raising
and transactional activity. For a report prepared at the direction of New York City's mayor, Michael
Bloomberg, and Senator Charles Schumer that plays upon this theme by calling for modifications of
the way SOX has been implemented, see SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP, available at http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/om/html/2007a/prO2l-

07.html.
82. See, e.g., Bob Greifeld, The View From Nasdaq, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2004, at A0. Wall
Street's foreign competitors have precisely the opposite incentive: to portray SOX (and U.S.-style
securities regulation generally) in the worst possible light, accurately or not. In many ways, U.S.based market participants are fighting distorted perceptions of U.S. regulation and litigation that
harm those same markets as they influence issuers and managers to avoid them.
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readily without demanding adequate compensation for the residual risk,
Wall Street is probably less likely to support such protections and instead
join in the opportunism. 3
D. Accountants and Auditors
Of all the groups that have been enriched by SOX, accounting firms
seem to be the winners. That is ironic because of how much responsibility
for the financial scandals was placed on accountants, and of course there are
significant costs to the profession as well-the replacement of selfregulation with the PCAOB and the loss of nonaudit income due to the independence rules. But auditing was plainly promoted in regulatory
importance, and public issuers have no choice but to be audited. 84 As noted
earlier, the required auditing of internal controls has increased revenues substantially, and presumably profits as well. The highly concentrated nature of
the industry,
. .. made more
. . so
85 by the demise of Arthur Andersen, limits issuers'
opinion-shopping ability.
One would expect, then, for the accountants to be strong SOX supporters, at least with respect to those provisions that move greater company
resources to Generally Accepted Accounting Practices ("GAAP") compliance and audit procedures. This has certainly been the case both overtly and
subtly, as in the gradual expansion of the scope of enterprise risk management as part of the internal controls function-accomplished by the
accounting industry's semi-independent Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission ("COSO").16 This can rightly be called
rent-seeking behavior, though not in the purely opportunistic sense. 87 SOX
privileges GAAP and auditing in many ways, and the profession has official
public support for re-imagining itself as a more powerful, conservative voice
in corporate governance. We saw earlier that this is having its intended effects. Audit quality seems to have improved, and accounting results have
become more conservative. Accountants are thus likely to tell the
SOX story
8s
as a success even though they might chafe under portions of it.
When considered alongside general managerial opposition to SOX reforms, the auditors' favorable telling of the SOX story sets up the most
tension we have observed thus far. The outcome of the negotiation between
83.

See Paul G. Mahoney, Commentary, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81

VA.

L. REV. 713, 716 (1995).

84.

See Cox, supra note 24.

85.
See Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firms' Audits of Large Clients, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD.

263, 264-65 (2004).

86.

See Conference Board, supra note 67.

87.

See Langevoort, Internal Controls, supra note 11, at 966-68.

88. Although this discussion identifies accountants as the interested actors, there actually is a
broader "compliance" industry of consultants, software and information technology specialists, and
the like with similar interests. On the latter, see Kris Maher, Career Journal: Sarbanes Oxley Is
Boon for Slew of Consultants, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2003, at BI.
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managers and auditors will depend on who captures the interpretation of
these SOX provisions most effectively and garners support from other constituencies. Though it is too early to speculate about the outcome beyond
substantial early success for the auditors in terms of post-SOX audit revenues, we might reflect briefly on some of the possible subtle consequences
of greater auditor primacy. As noted earlier, conservative financial reporting
is comforting to creditors, shareholders, and others who see it as a disciplinary or monitoring tool. How well investors do under a highly conservative
regimen depends
on balancing this comfort against the corresponding loss in
89
accuracy. By definition, conservative GAAP reporting on average understates the true economic value of the firm, which can never be fully captured
within a rigorous framework of rules or principles of general applicability.
How much, if at all, conservative reporting deprives investors of useful information is controversial, 9° but to the extent that it does, aggressive
interpretations of SOX will reflect that cost. This is an important part of the
internal controls debate, too. Investment in internal controls may well have a
positive payoff in the capital markets to the extent that it exposes weaknesses that relate to material aspects of the business. 9' But if the investments
are skewed toward the labor-intensive but less important aspects of the business-which might be the most profitable strategy for the auditors to
encourage-the likelihood that it will generate such payoffs is reduced.
To the extent that auditors gain bargaining power, managers may have to
negotiate and compromise in other ways as well. They may, for instance, acquiesce in the labor-intensive work in return for less attention to more
sensitive issues, such as managerial risk-taking.9 We might also see managers
select independent directors to serve on audit committees who have greater
financial or accounting expertise as counterweights to the external
auditors. 93 That is an important compromise, however, because by changing
the character and identity of the independent directors, the interests and attention of the board begins to shift, and some control is lost. There is
evidence, for example, that having greater accounting expertise on the audit
committee correlates with greater conservatism in financial reporting, 94 and

89.

See Cunningham, supra note 66, at 790.

90.

Anil Arya et al., Are Unmanaged Earnings Always Better for Shareholders?, 17 ACCT.
(Supp. 2003).

HORIZONS I l I

91.

See supra note 38.

92. Section 404's internal controls obligation as initially articulated may have this effect
because it concentrates on assuring that routines are well constructed but does not do quite as well at
assuring that surveillance resources target sensitive risks with respect to senior managers gaming
the system. See Langevoort, Internal Controls, supra note 11, at 972-73; Michael G. Alles &
Srikant Datar, How do you stop the books from being cooked? A management control perspective
on financial accounting standard setting and the section 404 requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, I INT'L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERANCE 119, 132 (2004).
93.

See Linck et al., supra note 35, at 38.

94. Gopal V. Krishnan & Gnanakumar Visvanathan, Does the Sox Definition of an Accounting Expert Matter? The Association Between Audit Committee Director's Expertise and
Conservatism 4 (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=866884.
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having greater financial expertise correlates with reduced misreporting
risk. 95 Whether these seemingly beneficial outcomes carry heavy costs as
well (e.g., resistance to value-added projects because the accounting issues
posed are too risky, or loss of strategic advice) is an open question.
E. Lawyers
Lawyers have the most control over the interpretation of SOX: they are
the ones who, in the first instance, describe it, wrestle with its ambiguities,
and guide clients through the initial rounds of compliance. The profession's
collective inferences as to SOX's meaning and legitimacy are bound to have
a substantial influence on other interpretive communities.
Lawyers, of course, are a diverse bunch, so generalization here is particularly challenging. But we can make some predictions. First, sociological
evidence shows that corporate lawyers do tend to identify with their clients'
needs and interests, an essential survival trait in a competitive market for
high-end legal services. On the other hand, their economic power comes
from their expertise in managing legal risk in complex environments. The
more serious the threat and the more complex and difficult the law is, the
greater the need for legal expertise and hence the greater the rents.97 In this
respect, SOX was a gift to corporate lawyers-economic and political circumstances heightened the perceived risk, and SOX layered sets of
complicated new regulations on issuers. Moreover, many of the reforms
(new audit committee responsibilities, internal controls obligations, disclosure enhancements such as the revised Management Discussion and
Analysis report) have resulted in work that is ongoing rather than a one-time
adjustment to new mandates, making SOX particularly lucrative for corporate lawyers. 98 In the manager-lawyer negotiation to control a given
transaction or obligation, SOX increases the lawyer's bargaining power because it is unclear how much is necessary and how much is inflated.
Because lawyers benefit from SOX compliance efforts, I predict that the
legal profession's internal construal will be expansive, albeit with a public
display of sympathy for the difficulties "well-meaning business people"
(i.e., their clients or potential clients) face in adjusting to the uncertainties of
the new regime. As with accountants, lawyers can see much in SOX that
resonates with legitimate concerns: precautionary procedures, routines, and
checks and balances are the stuff lawyers learn to value. In general, they will
be comfortable with an assessment of SOX as bolstering the need for good
95.

See Agrawal & Chadha, supra note 33, at 374.

96.

See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER (1988). In-house counsel play a somewhat different role because of their closer identification with management. For a good study of inhouse lawyer reaction to SOX's effort to bring directors into compliance decisions, see Rosen, supra
note 59, at 1277-92.
97. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of
Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997).
98. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 59, at 1258 ("The real story is that the corporate bar has been
made stronger and richer by SOX.").
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preventive maintenance inside the company, which constant change amid
competitive pressures otherwise causes well-meaning issuers to defer. And
state-of-the-art SOX compliance can help the client distinguish itself from
lesser firms. All of these are ways savvy lawyers can finesse the difficult
task of enhancing their power without alienating their client-managers, who
are presumably much more skeptical.
Also, as with accountants, managers may well promote lawyers in importance because of their skills and contacts as intermediaries with
regulators. It is perhaps not surprising that Linck and his co-authors report
that, post-SOX, the largest percentage of new corporate directors were lawyers.9 That, too, is interesting because the lawyer's natural attention and
interest will be to attend to legal risk, giving more support to compliance
and internal controls. We might assume that lawyers would also be more
sensitive to shareholder interests because that is the legal model of the firm.
But I would guess that most elite corporate lawyers share managers' beliefs
about the normative structure of business management, albeit with more
sensitivity to legal risk and the need to satisfy shifting regulatory expectations. If anything, I would argue that a shift toward greater lawyer
involvement in corporate governance would come closer to the alternative
interpretation of SOX offered earlier: diffusing managerial autonomy in favor of more emphasis on process and deliberation.
F. Regulators
The key to how SOX will be interpreted initially is largely in the hands
of the regulators, primarily the SEC and the PCAOB. Although the initial
rule-making is largely done, interpretation and enforcement is only beginning. And it is clear that the latter process dominates the message sent to
other interpretive communities and establishes the level of legal risk. The
regulators have the ability to turn the heat up or down fairly quickly with
respect to any statutory provision or rule. A good example of this is the internal controls requirements in place before section 404. It is commonly
assumed that the financial scandals leading to SOX involved widespread
control failures that justified the new regulations. Yet since 1978, public
companies have been obligated by both statute and SEC rule to have
"reasonable" systems of internal controls in place and to respect internal
controls procedures. If the assumption about control failures is right, this
largely failed as effective regulation, and the reason is that the SEC was not
diligent about enforcement; in fact, it signaled so early on.'0° By the late
1990s, issuers showed relatively little sensitivity to the need for particularly

99.

Linck et al., supra note 35, at 43.

100. See Langevoort, Internal Controls, supra note 11, at 953. To be sure, the funding structure of the PCAOB (based on fees charged to issuers) may lead to less political sensitivity and more
consistent enforcement of audit-related obligations. See Coates, supra note 14, at 99-100.
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rigorous controls on financial reporting. Check-the-box-style compliance
was enough. SOX could have the same fate if the regulators so choose.' O'
To predict the SEC's likely attitude to SOX enforcement, one needs a
tractable theory of administrative behavior tied to the Commission's unique
incentive structure, a daunting task beyond our current knowledge. My impression, which I have sketched out more fully elsewhere, is that the SEC is
quite responsive to external pressures. '°2 But that does not translate easily
into a dark capture story because the most powerful external constituencies
actually value its core work in mandating disclosure and prosecuting fraud
(i.e, there is a plausible economic theory behind its work). As such, the SEC
uses its enforcement ability to adjust demands with an eye toward keeping
the U.S. capital markets attractive as well as reasonably honest. It is not always prescient in its choices,0 but
it is disciplined by external forces when it
3
wanders too far off the mark.1
So the initial assumption that the SEC would be a fervent SOX enthusiast, imperialistically embracing its expanded role in corporate governance,
is probably wrong. It will use SOX moderately (and aggressively when
scandals reoccur), but in general it will stay close to a -common law" pattern of mixed messages-regularly reminding issuers and investors of its
presence but backing off if key interests become too provoked.
That said, the SEC is likely over the long run to ally with accountants
and lawyers in valuing process and caution as the major accountability
themes of SOX, in addition to its unusual interest in optimal transparency.
Because lawyers and (to a far lesser extent) accountants dominate the SEC
staff, those professions have a strong influence on internal agency perceptions, which mediate political pressures that business interests exert.
Historically, the SEC has seen its mission as protecting investors, albeit with
a "lawyer's bias" to construing investor needs in a way that privileges regulation over non-regulation. An interesting question is whether this
concentration on investor needs still exists, or whether the SEC, too, is shifting its beliefs so that public accountability is being promoted more
prominently than enhancing shareholder wealth. If the latter, then the SEC,
too, may promote a public-interest interpretation of SOX's meaning and
legitimacy.
G. The Media

Many analyses of the key groups contesting SOX's meaning would stop
with the foregoing. I would argue, however, that two remaining forces are
101. At the international level, a good bit of evidence underscores that the way securities
regulators enforce the law is more important to capital marketplace participants than what the law
on the books says. See, e.g., Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75 (2002); Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter?: Some
PreliminaryComparative Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144 (2005).
102.

See Langevoort, SEC as a Lawmaker, supra note 3.

103. See John C. Coates, IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 531 (2001).
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also key to SOX's social construction and may gradually tip its balance: the
media and corporate employees. The media is important in ways that have
been under-appreciated by corporate law scholars. Although orthodox finance theory might suggest otherwise, bad publicity can have a negative
effect on the stock price of a given issuer regardless of whether it conveys
new information'0 and may also have an effect on investor sentiment generally. Bad publicity can also damage the company's social license with
customers, employee morale, and access to public resources.'O° Directors
may react to press coverage because they lack inside knowledge of the company and hence may find media criticism of insiders credible. °6 Perhaps
more importantly, directors are particularly sensitive to preserving their own
reputation and elite status and want to avoid embarrassing criticism of their
own behavior.'07 The media also affects regulatory choices. The SEC gets
many of its cases because of media reports, and it is acutely
sensitive to me08
dia blame if it is perceived as lax in its appointed tasks.1
The question, then, is whether the media will be an independent source
of SOX interpretation and push some vision of it. The plausible generalization here is yes, perhaps powerfully so. Reporters covet scandal and happily
ignore hindsight bias to speculate about who knew what and when, who
could have foreseen and prevented the harm, and so on. Post-SOX, the financial media seized on both the themes of reform (accountability and
transparency) and its specific initiatives (e.g., director independence, internal controls) in making assessments. Management and boards are subject to
intense criticism when it appears they have fallen short on any dimension.
I predict that the media's interpretive preferences tend toward the public
accountability rather than shareholder primacy version of SOX. That is, investor harm is not privileged over harm to other stakeholders in the
aftermath of scandal, nor is there much sensitivity to the costs of too much
caution for the diversified shareholder. The media is the strongest promoter
of the precautionary principle that harms should have been prevented, and
SOX is about prophylactics. Obviously, this leads to mixed messages about
SOX. When new scandals arise, the "why didn't SOX work" question is
pointedly raised, which is potentially damaging-especially if read in conjunction with episodic (presumably management-inspired) coverage of the
costs SOX generates. But this does not easily play into a strategy of less
regulation and more managerial autonomy. Norms entrepreneurs committed
to an expansive vision can comment that someone hadn't gotten the message

104.

Gur Huberman & Tomer Regev, Contagious Speculation and a Curefor Cancer:A Non-

event that Made Stock PricesSoar, 56 J.
105.

FIN.

387 (2001).

See Gunningham et al., supra note 4, at 330.

106. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Farrell & David A. Whidbee, Monitoring by the FinancialPress
and Forced CEO Turnover, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 2249, 2273-74 (2002).
107. On "status anxiety" at the company level, see Michael Jensen, Should We Stay or Should
We Go? Accountability, Status Anxiety and Client Defections, 51 ADMIN. Scl. Q. 97 (2006).
108.

See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 3.
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(or that there was political interference, etc.) and that even more accountability-inducing mechanisms or enforcement resources are the answer.
H. CorporateEmployees

One final group deserves serious consideration as a potentially important post-SOX interpretive community: mid- and lower-level corporate
employees.' °9 Legal academics in corporate law pay little attention to company employees; by and large, the manager-shareholder relationship
dominates academic analysis, with efficiency rather than redistributive consequences the standard metric for assessing optimality. Organization theory
pays substantial attention to human resources, and the common assumption
is that employee morale, attitudes, and behaviors strongly influence competitiveness and profitability. "° Employee resistance (or incapacity) can
thwart good decisions at the top, making human resource management a key
element of business strategy.
This assumption connects to SOX in two ways."' One of the important
lessons of Enron and WorldCom (and Arthur Andersen) is that employees
are substantially at risk from managerial misbehavior and skewed incentives. Presumably, there is greater internal anxiety to being the next Enron.
To the extent that SOX's internal controls requirements lead to a more open
internal firm architecture, employees may observe more than they did previously. And to the extent that those controls-both embedded in the systems
and in more formal SOX-mandated whistle-blower mechanisms-encourage
"reporting up" concerns and suspicions, employees may aid enforcement.
To be sure, there are inevitably pressures in organizations that deter whistleblowing, and job mobility may allow some employees to exit rather than
assume the risk. But it is not entirely clear these will be so potent if employees with strong ties to the firm fear for their jobs and retirement savings if
the spotted misconduct is real, especially as the concern spreads contagiously. If, as suggested above, lawyers and accountants pressure firms to
build alternative communications channels to the standard organization
chart, the risk to employees from reporting up may be reduced.
The second SOX effect is cultural. Employees may not only sense
greater anxiety from the risk of impropriety as a result of media coverage of
financial reporting scandals, but may increasingly consider violations of
accountability and transparency norms to be illegitimate. Their emotional
attachment to the firm triggers resentment when they learn managers unfairly put them at risk. That, too, may make employees more likely to report
up in ways that trigger SOX-type governance interventions. And even if it
109.

See Sally Riggs Fuller et al., Legal Readings: Employee Interpretationand Mobilization

of Law, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 200 (2000).

110.

See Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 69.

11I. On this issue, see Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley'sStructuralModel to Encourage
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107, and David L. Schwarzkopf & Hugh M.
Miller, Early Evidence of How Sarbanes-Oxtey Implementation Affects Individuals and their Workplace Relationships, 110 Bus. & Soc'y REV. 21 (2005).
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does not, anxiety and fear increase, which can spread and threaten productivity without setting off formal alarms. The "chatter" itself may provoke
suspicions.' 2 All this creates disincentives for managers who try to hide selfish or risky behaviors, and increases the pressure on senior management to
accept substantive monitoring mechanisms.
We should put employees in the group particularly likely to see SOX's
meaning and legitimacy in public rather than investor-oriented terms. True,
they may also be shareholders, but in many firms their human capital (and
perhaps their retirement savings) are concentrated enough that their interests
become more like creditors than investors. Such employees may value the
process associated with greater transparency and accountability-and they
may be particularly invested in the precautionary principle.
IV. INTERPRETIVE INTERACTIONS

A. PressureToward Compromise
As should be clear by now, my argument is that SOX's meaning and
perceived legitimacy will be determined by an interaction among all the interpretive communities described in Part III. This interaction occurs in many
different venues-political lobbying in Congress and the agencies as well as
cultural jockeying in the media about the meaning of SOX. How that interaction will play out is impossible to predict because it will be a feedback
process with so many unknown variables.
The future could favor managers if the social construction that SOX was
a dangerous ("quack") overreaction prevails. Plainly, managers have powerful political and expressive resources. The most damning critique at their
disposal is to link the over-regulation story with loss of competitiveness and
off-shore migration of jobs and capital. This well-publicized storyline seeks
to enlist employees and taxpayers as allies. Such an alliance has the strength
to trump any rent seeking by accountants and lawyers. It also invites rent
seeking by managers themselves to the extent that they can cut back even
those aspects of SOX that generate value for investors at the expense of
managerial autonomy.
SOX compliance could also turn against corporate executives. Were the
SEC to act zealously with respect to SOX expansion and enforcement,
accountants and lawyers would be all the more empowered and would gain
more control over the implementation of SOX. If this implementation were
followed by another round of scandals and a market drop, institutional investors, employees, and the press would mobilize, overwhelming
managerial resistance to the encroachments. The SOX story could then become a mythic war narrative and provide support for new calls to bolster
SOX.
112. See Dennis Wright Michaud et al., Empowering Board Audit Committees: Electrnic
Discovery to Facilitate Corporate Fraud Detection (Apr. 2, 2006), http://www.ssm.comabstract=
896004; Langevoort, Internal Controls, supra note 11, at 225-26.
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I doubt, however, that either of these extremes will come to pass. Rather,
SOX's meaning and legitimacy will be a story mainly about compromise,
disappointing enthusiasts but also giving critics far less meat to chew. The
earliest signals have come from the SEC and the PCAOB, which have backtracked quickly on an expansive approach to internal controls reports and
audits. This is moderation rather than total abandonment-the SEC will not,
for instance, exempt small businesses from section 404's requirements entirely, as called for by its own advisory committee'3-but it is sensitive
nonetheless to managers' arguments and political muscle.' 4 As noted earlier,
the SEC is attentive to Wall Street's concerns. Brokers and stock exchanges

in the United States are understandably nervous about firms exiting the public capital markets or foreign countries becoming more hospitable sites for
capital markets. Thus, the regulators are turning down the heat.

Down, probably, but not off. The regulators (and financial media) are
still sensitive to the risk of damage from future accounting scandals that
seem attributable to political pressure or loss of will. Moreover, the battle
against managerial opportunism has become a larger part of the SEC's culture in the last five years; this will be hard to shed quickly without
generating resentment within the agency's staff. Most importantly, the legal
and accounting professions may not surrender their new power easily, and
their influence within the SEC is still extraordinarily strong. Other key interests-institutional investors, the media-will also call the SEC to task if
it backs off too far. So SOX should continue to be enforced with cautious

moderation.
In such an atmosphere of compromise, the second-level effects will be
the most interesting. To the extent that lawyers and accountants gradually

113. See Financial Reporting of Foreign Private Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8730,
71 Fed. Reg. 47,056 (Aug. 15, 2006) (foreign issuers); Financial Reporting of Non-Accelerated
Filers and Newly Public Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8731 (proposed Aug. 9, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2006/33-8731.pdf (smaller companies); Steven
Marcy, SEC Promises More Section 404 Guidance But Rejects Exemption for Small Companies, 38
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 901 (May 22, 2006). Perhaps more dramatically, the SEC and the
PCAOB announced a rethinking of how internal controls should be implemented and evaluated in
late 2006, backtracking considerably on the expansive approach put in place right after SOX. See
SEC Rel. No. 33-8762, 71 Fed. Reg. 77635 (Dec. 27, 2006) (proposed interpretive guidance);
PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 021, Release 2006-007 (Dec. 19, 2006) (proposed rescission of
Auditing Standard No. 2), available at http://www.pcaob.org//Rules/Docket 021/index.aspx.
114. The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, comprised of leading business and Wall
Street leaders as well as some well-known academics, issued a well-publicized report that made
international competitiveness its dominant theme as it called for significant changes to the implementation of section 404 as well as other aspects of securities regulation. See Interim Report of the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/
research/html; see also SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES
LEADERSHIP, supra note 81. Other examples of backtracking are abundant. For instance, the Commission first proposed a definition of financial expert that was limited to accounting expertise, but
reversed course under pressure from the issuer community-thereby expanding it to include former
senior executives who were engaged in financial reporting. On risk disclosure relating to the use of
derivatives and off-books entities, the Commission proposed a broad reading of the new MD&A
mandates but then reversed course when told that it would generate too much disclosure. See Frank
Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of "May", 48 VILL. L. REv. 1245,
1272-76 (2003).
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gain more control over the organizational architecture of SOX complianceaudit committee activities, internal controls procedures, operational and
compliance audits, whistle-blower protection programs-managers will lose
places to hide. This will be especially noticeable if low- and mid-level corporate employees become, as I suggested earlier, more sensitive to risk
created by managerial misbehavior. The question then becomes whether
managers will compensate by working that much harder at finding new hiding places, by subtly bribing the accountants and lawyers with controls
systems that make it lucrative for monitors to do some kinds of investigative
work but not others, or by adjusting to the new constraints.
B. Contesting the Role of the Independent Director
Of all the questions relating to the social construction of SOX, the most
telling involves the long-running contest to define-or redefine-the role of
the independent director in the public corporation. Current scholarship and
practice disagree substantially about what directors are supposed to do, and
the resulting role conflict has led to a good deal of tension and uncertainty
in the boardroom. This has largely been a battle about shareholder primacy.
As noted earlier, SOX does nothing to empower investors in this contest.
To the contrary, it adds substantial director workload unrelated to wealthmaximization. As post-SOX research by Linck et al. indicates, board members
now have to work more hours, and hence are paid more. " ' Alternatively or
additionally, the size of the board might grow so that the effect of the increased workload on any one director is reduced. Larger boards may favor
managers and be a net loss for investors because larger boards are less effective at oversight than smaller ones.'" 6 Even if boards remain small,
displacement might cause the same effect: if the tasks to which the directors
pay attention are a smaller part of the overall scope of real economic activity, executives may focus on good cosmetic appearances where directors are
forced to look and preserve their autonomy where directors are not looking.
More work may also mean less attention to strategic issues that best inform
17
an evaluation of the CEO and his or her team.'
The bigger question here concerns directors' attitudes and focus of attention. The weak spot in the independence movement has always been that a
company's senior management dominates the selection of independent directors, which means management can select for certain attitudes and
preferences. My sense is that, to the extent feasible, managers prefer directors who not only share elite bonds and have useful external contacts, but
who share the ideology that all stakeholders, including shareholders, are

115. Linck et al., supra note 35, at 4.
116. See id. at 28, 43; see generally David Yermack, Higher market valuation of companies
with a small boardof directors,40 J. FIN. EcON. 185 (1996).
117. See Tom Kirchmaier & Mariano Selvaggi, The Dark Side of "Good" CorporateGovernance: Compliance-Fuelled Book-Cooking Activities 2-3 (FMG, Discussion Paper No. 559, 2006),
availableat http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=895362.
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external claimants to be bargained with or managed-that is, that the corporation's best interests are not identical with shareholder's expressed
interests. Implicitly, this privileges management's voice in articulating those
best interests. Like managers, independent directors so chosen can learn to
act out the rhetoric of fiduciary obligation to satisfy investor audiences but
in fact have little constraint except as needed to assure that the necessary
resources (capital, labor, regulatory approval) remain stable. They can do
this without any guilt because institutional stewardship-rather than serving
the pecuniary interests of a particular group-has a great deal of normative
appeal.
Little or nothing in SOX alters this directly. Stock exchange rules do
now require an independent nominating committee to take charge of the
selection of new directors, and an SEC rule unrelated to SOX requires procedures for listening more closely to investor preferences on director
selection. " ' But if the social and ideological ties with respect to management are strong enough initially, this shift alone will have little effect-the
hierarchy will still reproduce. Without more than formalistic structural
changes, then, we would expect SOX to have little positive effect on director
attitudes and perhaps be a net loss for the reasons stated earlier. We would
also expect similar resentment toward SOX from independent directors who
share management's ideology-SOX increases workload, arguably increases
legal risk, and distracts them from their preferred tasks.
As we saw in Part I, however, it is possible to construe SOX not in
terms of the familiar dichotomy between managerialism and shareholder
wealth maximization but as insisting on something of a "third way"-the
infusion of public process values into the large corporation." 9 Independent
directors are plainly the main agents conscripted to this task. SOX gives
independent directors greater de jure control over transparency. 2 0 So much
of the new workload is related to audit and disclosure issues. Under this
reading, the resulting "distraction" is exactly what was intended; transparency, for the benefit of audiences well beyond the company's current
shareholders, becomes a social priority. The slightly more subtle message is
that independent directors are also to be conduits for the public's voice in
the corporation's governance, especially on matters that might put key
stakeholders at risk.
118. SEC Schedule 14A, Item 7, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/schedl4a.pdf#
search=%22schedule%2014a%22.
119.

See Williams & Conley, supra note 49, on this "third way" generally.

120. See Sale, supra note 58. Jeffrey Gordon's work on independent directors suggests that
over the last few decades, their dominant role has been to connect internal corporate governance to
external stock price signals under conditions that increasingly make stock prices more informed
(and hence informative). Jeffrey N. Gordon, Independent Directors and Stock Market Prices: The
New Corporate Governance Paradigm (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 74/2006,
2006), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=928 100. At the same time, he suggests that independent
directors can more easily be mobilized to seek greater stock price accuracy and better compliance
with law. My claim here is not inconsistent with this, but emphasizes that SOX may be pulling directors away from single-minded attention to shareholder wealth maximization and hence
introducing more role conflict than was previously present.
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The implementation of SOX is not the first time outside directors have
been asked to play a more public-regarding role, and prior efforts were
beaten back. 2' So why would now be any different? SOX does not explicitly
require independent directors to do anything more than attend to new tasks,
which may mean relatively little without accountability mechanisms to motivate independent directors to pay them more than lip service. After all,
neither dominant interest-managers or investors-will acquiesce in more
public accountability without external pressure. Managers are adept at lip
service and can presumably seek out directors who are just as gifted.
But I think that the set of interests just described can, under the right circumstances, exert pressure in a way that will generate increasing role
conflict for independent directors and gradually lead to some redefinition.
Accountants and (to a lesser extent) lawyers have an interest, as we have
seen, in having independent directors who will advocate for more attention
and resources for internal controls, compliance, and other process and transparency-oriented efforts. They will use their expertise over "what the law
requires" to get directors' attention and support. As they interact directly and
more frequently with the independent directors, as SOX insists, they will
repeatedly push this message, muting managements' efforts to control their
attention. If, as early evidence suggests, managers feel compelled to bring
more lawyers and accountants (or former regulators or other government
officials) onto their boards to respond to SOX, this diffusion of control
mechanisms will likely be hastened.
The regulators may well aid this diffusion, intentionally or not. As I have
suggested, we can expect caution from the regulators in SOX enforcement.
And in its role as "investor's champion," the SEC should in theory be hesitant to distract from wealth maximization and risk-taking as governance
goals. But as critics have rightly pointed out, bureaucratic incentives are
asymmetric-there is pressure to intervene when risk-taking goes bad and
causes losses, but no offsetting incentive to reward when risk-taking goes
well. 2 The SEC, in other words, has a natural precautionary bias. Even a
moderate post-SOX enforcement program is likely to send cautionary signals regarding independent directors' duties, which accountants and lawyers
will then amplify.
The media may turn out to be an even more powerful agent in helping
turn independent directors into public directors. Putting aside legal accountability, there is now greater reputational risk associated with being a director
when things go wrong if, in hindsight, appropriate SOX procedures were not
121. For varying perspectives on the efforts in the 1970s to alter the role of the outside director, see Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-HeavenlyCity or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 597 (1982); Karmel, supra note 61. That neither regulators nor courts have been inclined to
impose liability on outside directors for breaching their duties has plainly softened the effort to
conscript directors in any particular direction. See generally Bernard Black et al., Outside Director
Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006).
122. See supra note 73.
123. See Pritchard, supra note 3; Stephen S. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics
and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 35 (2003).
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followed or red flags were ignored. 2 4 To the extent that corporate accountability resonates with broad societal (and investor) expectations, the press is
unlikely to go easy on elites on corporate boards tainted with scandal, imagined or real. Elites' sensitivity to criticism is high, and as the risk of bad
press from SOX deficiencies grows, so does the precautionary pressure.
Simply as an illustration of this extra-legal pressure to conform, I would
note how frequently boards of non-profit institutions are now called to ac-

count when problems arise from not having "SOX-type" governance
mechanisms such as good audit practices, independent trustees, and the

like.2 5 Of course, the bulk of SOX does not apply to non-profits at all, yet
such boards have discovered that in the public's mind-or at least the media's-it really does.

For these reasons, I think it is at least plausible that SOX will be a
proximate cause for a gradual redefinition of the director's role.1 6 To be
sure, these effects would probably occur even without SOX, but SOX's le-

gally-enforceable mandates both hasten and constrain the institutional
responses to shifting pressures. Changes in the law cause cognitive dislocation, forcing actors out •of
•. .old
127 habits and prompting them to renegotiate their
status and responsibilities. To be clear, I am not predicting a complete
shift-the power exerted by executives and wealth-oriented shareholders is
too strong, and there is ample room for symbolic rather than real attention to
accountability pressures. I leave as an open question where the balance will
be struck, but strongly suspect that norms will settle someplace other than
where executives or investors would prefer. Transparency can never be confined to the investors' gaze, and accountability takes place in multiple
forums: outside the company in courts, elections, and public opinion; inside
the company in board compensation and retention as well as employee attitudes and morale. The ability to persuade an audience that concealed risktaking or misbehavior actually had a positive expected value for investors is
minimal in most of these forums, regardless of whether it is true. If so,
SOX's institutional infrastructure will more and more prompt directors to
act as speed bumps, thereby constraining enterprise risk.

124.
See Floyd Norris, A Heavyweight Board, Light on the Supervision, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 1,
2004, at Cl (criticizing the Hollinger board, with reference to SOX's internal controls requirements). But see Floyd Norris, Atmel's Mess: You're Fired.No, You Are, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2006,
at C1 (crediting Atmel's independent directors and crediting SOX reforms for enabling the activism).
125.
For a discussion of non-profit governance post-SOX, see Lumen N. Mulligan, What's
Good For the Goose is Not Good For the Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1981 (2007); Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205 (2004) (describing state
attorney general efforts to impose SOX standards as matters of fiduciary responsibility).
126.
One might add here that public and labor sector institutional investors might well become part of the pressure toward "publicization." See supra text accompanying note 79.
127.
See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection:
The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1161 (2003); Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's
Wrong?, J. App. CoRP.FIN. 8, 19 (2002).
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V. SMALL ISSUERS, FOREIGN ISSUERS, AND U.S. COMPETITIVENESS

The discussion just concluded raises the strongest practical criticisms of
SOX. It is causing small issuers to suffer disproportionately and, in many
cases, to exit the public company regime;... it deters foreign issuers from
cross-listing in the United States or otherwise seeking capital from American investors;129 it puts U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage vis-Avis less encumbered foreign counterparts; and it encourages regulatory arbitrage in the structuring of multinational businesses. 30 Critics of SOX would
no doubt react to the idea of SOX as a public law construct by saying such
an interpretation would just make this worse.
There is little doubt that SOX was written with companies (and externalities) the size of Enron and WorldCom in mind. Small issuers' compliance
costs are relatively larger as a percentage of assets or market capitalization.
Linck et al. also show that the cost of attracting and retaining outside directors has increased markedly post-SOX for smaller issuers.' 3' The question,
then, is the return on investment for SOX compliance, on which there is no
compelling data. We do run into the problem that smaller issuers are more
susceptible to fraud and manipulation than larger issuers, because their trading markets are thinner and less sophisticated (i.e., less institutional
shareholding and analyst monitoring) and because reputational intermediaries such as high-end investment banks and law firms are out of their reach.
We might thus expect significant benefits from strict SOX compliance for
smaller companies. 3 2 But even these could be outweighed by the costs, and
I suspect they often are.131
The critics' evidence here is largely the increasing number of smaller issuers going dark or going private (i.e., deregistering as public companies
under the Securities Exchange Act, if not cashing out their public shareholders entirely), which proves the inefficiency of SOX's mandates on these
companies. In standard economic theory, this is right: a change in regulation
should not lead to exit if the regulation is valued by investors. The cost of
capital goes down, making it more attractive to be a public company, not
less. That, however, assumes the market is relatively efficient, which is not
necessarily true for the smallest companies. An alternative hypothesis is that
company insiders value the private benefits of control lost under SOX,

128.

See Carney, supra note 39.

129.

E.g.,

130.

Id. at 74.

131.

See Linck et al., supra note 35.

BUTLER

& RIBSTEIN, supra note 8, at 71-73.

132.
Disclosure of material weakness in internal controls is relatively more frequent for
smaller issuers. See Weili Ge & Sarah McVay, The Disclosure of Material Weaknesses in Internal
Controlafter the Sarbanes-OxleyAct, 19 ACCT. HORIZONS 137 (2005).
See Paul Rose, Balancing Public Market Benefits and Burdens for Smaller Companies
133.
Post Sarbanes-Oxley, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 707 (2005).
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which they
3 4 regain by a going-private or going-dark transaction of dubious
fairness. ,
The SEC has shown prompt sensitivity to this question, so some cost reductions are forthcoming. Otherwise, the question devolves into one that the
SEC wrestles with repeatedly in the so-called microcap market: what is the
right balance for investor protection in settings where other institutional
constraints are absent, making regulation particularly costly? Although there
are many possible answers (the analysis of which is well beyond the scope
of this paper), one is to chill public investment in marginal companies by
imposing regulatory costs,'35 thereby forcing such companies to find capital
through more sophisticated, less regulated private markets. In some sense,
the post-SOX exit of some of the smallest companies may be little more
than that, and it is no severe cause for public policy alarm except with respect to the fairness of the transaction that takes the company private.
We might add a comment about the "public" interpretation of SOX. If
this interpretation is indeed emerging, there is further reason to expect regulatory burdens on smaller businesses to be lightened. Employment and other
effects from small issuer activity are cumulatively significant, but on an individual basis the spillover effects from a single scandal are small and
localized. Sustained media attention is unlikely. SOX is concerned with
large-scale concentrations of economic power and wealth in managerial
hands, where the social consequences of failure are greater. Assuming this,
there will be relatively less resistance to interpretations of SOX that deregulate the smaller company.
We can say almost the same thing about foreign issuers. Because externalities from a foreign issuer scandal are felt mainly abroad, the U.S. public
is less likely to demand the same transparency and accountability from foreign issuers as from large public companies here. So far as the investor
protection goal is concerned, we confront a jurisdictional issue well beyond
SOX: what to do when capital markets become sufficiently global that the
location of a trading venue becomes arbitrary and basing regulation on trading location becomes impracticable. One might try to wall off U.S. investors
from stocks that are not adequately regulated, but that is unlikely to maintain U.S. competitiveness in providing financial services. In the long run, the
biggest threat to SOX's meaning and interpretation is the impossibility of
imposing it worldwide, so that it will always be susceptible to challenge by
countries and cultures that embrace some different vision of corporate governance and transparency. My sense is that Wall Street, at least, will make
134. See Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences
of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations (Am. Fin. Ass'n 2006 Boston Meetings Paper), available at
http://www.ssm.com/abstract=592421 (documenting a large negative abnormal return to going dark
transactions). Smaller companies are most likely to exit. See Ehud Kamar et al., Going-Private
Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country Analysis (U.S.C. Ctr. in Law,
Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. C06-5, 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=
901769.
135. This is evident in the SEC's penny stock rules, making it harder to solicit investor interest with respect to the smallest companies. See JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1049-50 (5th ed. 2006).
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sure the SEC remains aware of the risk to the domestic financial services
industry and that SOX enforcement will be moderated as a result, especially
with respect to foreign issuers. But again, the resolution of SOX issues will
be subsumed in much bigger debates about the future of transnational securities regulation.
That, in turn, brings us to the opposite side of the coin, the impact of
SOX on the world-wide competitiveness of U.S. companies. That, too, is an
issue frequently raised by critics. Assuming large foreign companies can
escape SOX-type obligations, do they gain an advantage over domestic
firms as a result? The impact could come either from compliance costs
themselves (which would probably be material only for smaller companies)
or from something like a reduced appetite for risk because of increased
transparency and accountability to a broader set of constituents. Here again
we should remember that the SEC is likely to adopt a relatively moderate
course on SOX enforcement because of the compromise of interests noted
earlier, and be sensitive to the small issuer concerns. So we shouldn't overstate the fear. Furthermore, companies in most foreign countries face greater
public-regarding pressures to avoid risk (albeit through very different gov13 6
ernance mechanisms, often including partial state ownership or control).
The United States/United Kingdom-style firms' entrepreneurial freedom has
been seen as their competitive advantage. However much SOX may be
gradually dampening the enterprise risk appetite, it is probably better to say
that its effect has been, at most, to bring U.S. firms slightly closer to the
international norm-a small, counterintuitive illustration of transnational
convergence in corporate governance.
CONCLUSION

SOX is still a work in progress; it may eventually do much or little, for
good or ill. My aim here has been less to make that assessment than to describe the processes by which its meaning will evolve and the interests that
will be influential in that social construction. The better we understand these
interests, the more we see that compromise is more likely to triumph than
either the critics' hostility or the enthusiasts' cheerleading. For that reason, I
find myself fairly ambivalent about SOX's ultimate impact.
This point about compromise echoes what we know about the diffusion
of other legal innovations. Employment discrimination has been well studied and offers some interesting comparative insights for corporate
scholars.' In the aftermath of Title VII, employers redesigned internal hiring and promotion structures, instituted training programs, and put
grievance procedures into place. Yet many responses were more symbolic

136. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditionsto Separating Ownershipfrom Corporate
Control,53 STAN. L. REv. 539 (2000).
137. See generally Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance
Proceduresas Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. Soc. 406 (1999); Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The Legal Environments of Organizations,23 ANN. REv. Soc. 479, 495-99 (1997).
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than real, leaving in place a sizable amount of managerial autonomy over
human resource decisions that allow efficiency-justifications (and perhaps3a8
lingering "taste" for discrimination) to displace fair employment practices.'
Second-level effects also took root. Once placed inside the organization,
human resource officers and grievance examiners developed a distinct professional identity to make sense of what they were doing, and began

bargaining for more resources by construing the law more expansively. 9 In
turn, their activities were visible to company employees and others, and so
raised internal expectations about fair hiring practices. These expectations
were bolstered, of course, by evolving social norms about discrimination
and workplace fairness-in many ways, the human resource professionals
were portals for the diffusion of external social norms inside the firm. In
turn, the resulting organizational practices took on a normative dimension,
as courts took note of what was established practice. Gradually and grudgingly, compliance became more embedded, if still far from the hoped-for
goal.
SOX is different in many ways, of course, but I think there will be
common threads to the stories. Enhanced independent director responsibilities, more expansive external audits, and pervasive internal controls all have
the capacity to be symbolic rather than real. Managers will try to capture
control of them to reduce their potency-in good faith, probably, extolling
trust and nimbleness over formal routines, paperwork, and other distractions
from the bottom line. But SOX places new independent directors, auditors,
and lawyers, as well as new cadres of internal audit and compliance professionals, in places they did not inhabit before. To the extent that they see an
adversarial role as legitimate and important, they may gradually develop a
more distinct professional identity, too, and from their new outposts, cause
expectations about adherence by management to norms of transparency and
accountability to increase among employees, investors, and others. They
probably also fear-if the SEC, PCAOB, and financial media are up to the
task-that they may increasingly be called to account for their seemingly
weak brain or spine if something goes wrong.
The way SOX is eventually understood will influence the extent to
which this will be so. Though this understanding rests only partially in the
hands of the SEC and PCAOB, their moderation-especially as applied to
smaller companies-is essential to cabin too much rent seeking by lawyers,
accountants, and others, which both hurts investors and invites a backlash
that allows critics to undermine the statute and its origins. SOX's social construction will be a product of the interaction between choices now being
made and events yet to come. From among competing stories, the winner
will be the one that best comports with shifting economics of investor138. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economicsof CriticalRace Theory,
112 YALE L.J. 1757 (2003) (book review); Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the Executive Suite: Grease, Grit, and the Corporate Promotion Tournament, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1615 (2004).
139. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Legal Ambiguity and the Politicsof Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers'Dilemma, 13 L. & POL'Y 73 (1991).
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manager relationships and social expectations about the obligations of private enterprise. Given the muddled nature of both the expectations and the
economics, and assuming that future events are not too far out of the ordinary, my best guess is that SOX's impact on doing business will be a subtle
"accountability creep," rather than a dramatic post-SOX epiphany, as part of
a long-running narrative about the boundaries and norms of corporate governance in a world that both celebrates and worries about private economic
power.
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